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In Defence of the 
Sphere of Influence  
 
Why the WGSR should not follow Professor 
Ruggie’s advice on defining the scope of 
social responsibility 
 
Stepan Wood, May 2010 
 
The Issue 
 
The Working Group on Social Responsibility 
(WGSR) of the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) will meet in 
Copenhagen from May 17 to 21, 2010 for 
what is likely to be its last meeting to work on 
ISO 26000, an international guide on social 
responsibility.   One of the central challenges 
for the WGSR is to define the scope of an 
organization’s responsibility for human rights 
abuses committed by third parties.  Should an 
apparel company be responsible for violations 
of workers’ rights in its suppliers’ factories?  
Should a mining company be responsible for 
illegal killings and assaults by private security 
forces contracted to protect its assets and 
personnel?  Should manufacturers of law 
enforcement equipment be responsible when 
police use them to suppress lawful assembly 
and expression?  In short, where and how 
should the boundaries of an organization’s 
responsibility be drawn when actors outside 
the organization violate human rights?  
ISO 26000, approved by a large 
majority in a recent “Draft International 
Standard” ballot, answers this question 
largely in terms of an organization’s degree of 
control or influence over others’ conduct.  
This “leverage-based” approach is based on 
the concept of “sphere of influence”, 
introduced into SR discourse by the United 
Nations Global Compact.  Professor John 
Ruggie, the Special Representative of the 
United Nations Secretary General on Business 
and Human Rights (SRSG), has warned the 
WGSR not to take this approach, calling it 
inconsistent with his three-part “protect, 
respect, remedy” framework.1   
Although Professor Ruggie’s views 
deserve great respect, ISO 26000 should 
maintain its “sphere of influence” approach 
because: 
 
• It reflects broad societal expectations 
• It is consistent with “due diligence”  
• It does not encourage inappropriate 
political interference 
• It does not encourage “gaming” 
• It is simple and intuitive 
• It builds on existing ISO standards  
• It avoids making a false distinction 
between supporting human rights and 
avoiding abuses 
• It is a necessary part of the solution 
to the business and human rights 
problem. 
 
Fulfilling Societal Expectations 
 
Decades of anti-sweatshop campaigns and 
consumer boycotts show that social actors – 
citizens, consumers, workers, indigenous and 
local communities, NGOs – will hold 
businesses accountable for the way in which 
they exercise or fail to exercise the influence 
they have over others to prevent or lessen 
human rights abuses.  As one report put it, 
“society at large will hold a company 
responsible for violations occurring in plants 
from which it sources products or services, 
and therefore over which it has a degree of 
influence.”2  
ISO 26000 reflects this widespread 
societal expectation when it says that “there 
will be situations where an organization’s 
ability to influence others will be 
accompanied by a responsibility to exercise 
that influence….  Generally, the responsibility 
for exercising influence increases with the 
ability to influence.”3  This is in line with the 
Global Compact’s E-Learning tool, which 
says: “the more control, authority or influence 
a business has over a situation giving rise to 
human rights abuses (or the means to improve 
respect for human rights), the greater the 
business responsibility to act.”4 
 
Promoting Due Diligence 
 
The “sphere of influence” approach is 
consistent with and supports the concept of 
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due diligence which lies at the heart of the 
corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights.   According to Professor Ruggie, due 
diligence “comprises reasonable steps by 
companies to become aware of, prevent, and 
address adverse impacts of their activities and 
relationships.”5  For him, “sphere of influence 
remains a useful metaphor for companies to 
think broadly about their human rights 
responsibilities and opportunities beyond the 
workplace” but “is of limited utility in 
clarifying the specific parameters of their 
responsibility to respect human rights” 
because it conflates “impacts” with 
“leverage”.6   
In Professor Ruggie’s view, the scope 
of social responsibility is defined by “the 
actual and potential human rights impacts 
generated through a company’s own business 
activities and through its relationships with 
other parties,” not by leverage.7  Corporations 
are responsible for their contributions to the 
actions of others, most importantly in the 
form of complicity in human rights abuses, 
which he defines as knowing contribution to 
another’s abuse of human rights.8   
 What Professor Ruggie fails to 
acknowledge, and what ISO 26000 and the 
Global Compact recognize, is that an 
organization may contribute to human rights 
abuses by acts of omission as well as 
commission.  When an organization has the 
ability to prevent or mitigate adverse human 
rights impacts by exercising influence over an 
actor with whom it is in a relationship, yet 
elects deliberately not to exercise that 
influence, it contributes to the resulting abuse.  
Its degree of complicity and hence 
responsibility may be less than if it had 
actively conspired with the abuser, but it is 
implicated nonetheless. 
 
Discouraging Political Interference 
 
Professor Ruggie asserts that it is undesirable 
“to require companies to act wherever they 
have influence, particularly over 
Governments.”9 Presumably, what makes this 
undesirable is the possibility of inappropriate 
meddling in public policy.  Yet surely such 
irresponsible political involvement would be 
inconsistent with social responsibility by 
definition.  Social responsibility includes 
responsible involvement in politics and public 
policy, as ISO 26000 recognizes.10   
The only reason to conclude that 
leverage-based social responsibility is not 
desirable is if one believes that organizations 
are bound to exercise their political influence 
irresponsibly.  If this is true, the entire project 
of social responsibility is in jeopardy.  If, on 
the other hand, organizations can exercise 
their influence responsibly, there is no reason 
not to demand they do so.   
 
Discouraging Strategic Gaming  
 
Professor Ruggie warns that “using influence 
as a basis for assigning responsibility invites 
strategic manipulation.”11  In his most recent 
report he explains that  
 
the proposition that corporate human 
rights responsibilities as a general rule 
should be determined by companies’ 
capacity, whether absolute or relative 
to States, is troubling. On that 
premise, a large and profitable 
company operating in a small and 
poor country could soon find itself 
called upon to perform ever-
expanding social and even governance 
functions – lacking democratic 
legitimacy, diminishing the State’s 
incentive to build sustainable capacity 
and undermining the company’s own 
economic role and possibly its 
commercial viability. Indeed, the 
proposition invites undesirable 
strategic gaming in any kind of 
country context.12 
 
The concern seems to be that 
leverage-based corporate responsibility will 
give governments an incentive to shirk their 
responsibilities in the hope that companies 
will step in to fill the breach.  But the state’s 
responsibility to protect human rights is 
independent of business’s responsibility to 
respect.  The state’s potential liability for 
neglecting or violating human rights is not 
diminished by corporate action to support 
those same rights.  Only the most 
unscrupulous governments would treat such a 
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situation as an excuse to shirk their legal 
responsibilities, and those governments would 
likely neglect their duty to protect human 
rights regardless of how the corporate 
responsibility to respect is defined.   
 
Promoting Simplicity 
 
Sphere of influence may be a metaphor, but it 
is one that organizations and stakeholders of 
all kinds can understand intuitively.  The idea 
of concentric circles of influence radiating 
outward from the organization is simple.  It 
subsumes a wide variety of relationships with 
different forms and pathways of influence 
under a single simple principle: the more 
influence the organization has over processes 
and outcomes, the more responsibility it has 
to exercise its influence.  
  There are various ways to 
operationalize the concept of sphere of 
influence, including the principle of 
“proximity”13 and the UN Global Compact’s 
“Arc of Human Rights Priorities” with its 
twin axes of human rights impact and 
connection to the company.14  Ruggie rejects 
the concept of proximity because it is unclear 
(e.g. what does “political proximity” mean?) 
and in some cases misleading (e.g. 
“geographic proximity” may obscure the fact 
that actions can affect people far away).  He 
concludes that “it is not proximity that 
determines whether or not a human rights 
impact falls within the responsibility to 
respect, but rather the company’s web of 
activities and relationships”.15  
It is hard to imagine how the term 
“web of activities and relationships” is any 
clearer than proximity, a concept familiar to 
lawyers worldwide.  Proximity plays a central 
role in private law in all the common law 
countries, as well as in international law.16  
Among other things, it is central to legal 
concepts of causation (“proximate cause”), 
foreseeability and duty of care.  While its 
meaning is open-textured and context-
dependent, millions of legal practitioners and 
judges employ it routinely to resolve disputes.    
Professor Ruggie proposes a three-part 
process to determine the scope of a 
company’s responsibility that is at least as 
abstract and vague as the “leverage-based” 
approach he rejects.  In his view, to determine 
the scope of its responsibility a company 
should: 
  
• understand the country context within 
which it operates;  
• assess the impacts of its own 
activities; and  
• analyze whether it might contribute to 
abuses through its relationships with 
third parties.17   
 
How organizations, let alone their 
stakeholders, are expected to translate these 
factors into concrete limits on social 
responsibility is far from clear.  How does a 
country’s human rights context affect the 
firm’s degree of responsibility?  How does 
one distinguish between an organization’s 
“own” activities and those of “others”?  Two 
examples Ruggie gives of a firm’s “own” 
activities, having “direct impact,” are political 
lobbying and the provision of security for 
personnel and assets.  These are odd 
examples, since security and lobbying 
functions are typically entrusted to third 
parties.  Moreover the impact of lobbying on 
human rights is indirect since it is the 
implementation of laws and policies that 
affects human rights, not the lobbying 
activities that may have influenced their 
content.  By presenting security and lobbying 
as activities with direct impacts, Professor 
Ruggie adds to the confusion surrounding 
these issues. 
Nor is it clear what kind or degree of 
contribution to abuse through an 
organization’s relationships is sufficient to 
attract responsibility.  On one hand, Professor 
Ruggie writes that “[a]voiding complicity is 
part and parcel of due diligence for ensuring 
that companies respect human rights”.18 On 
the other hand, he suggests that other forms of 
involvement might also give rise to 
responsibility.   
One example is knowingly benefiting 
from another’s abuse of human rights, which 
Professor Ruggie suggests is included in the 
scope of the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights even if the firm did not 
contribute to the abuse.19  He also seems to 
suggest that a company’s mere presence in a 
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setting where human rights abuses take place 
may give rise to responsibility: “operating in 
contexts where abuses occur and the 
appearance of benefiting from such abuses 
should serve as red flags for companies to 
ensure that they exercise due diligence”.20  
Other forms of involvement are suggested by 
his admonition that a company should “assess 
whether it might contribute to or be 
associated with harm caused by entities with 
which it conducts, or is considering 
conducting business or other activities” and 
“ensure that the company is not complicit, or 
otherwise implicated in human rights harms 
caused by others”.21 
In short, for all his emphasis on due 
diligence and complicity, Professor Ruggie is 
ultimately unclear about what kind and degree 
of connection to third-party human rights 
violations is sufficient to engage corporate 
responsibility.    
As Professor Ruggie acknowledges, 
determination of the scope of the 
responsibility to respect is bound to be 
inductive and fact-based.22 This is no 
different from the “sphere of influence” 
approach he rejects.  The latter, howeve
offers the advantage of conceptual simplicity
a firm’s leverage varies on a continuum f
no influence to complete control, and i
responsibility varies with its degree of 
leverage: the more leverage, the more 
responsibility.    
r, 
: 
rom 
ts 
 
Building on Existing Standards 
 
The sphere of influence approach fits well 
with existing widely accepted standards, 
including ISO 14001.  ISO 14001, the world’s 
leading environmental management system 
standard, recognizes that to be considered 
environmentally responsible, an organization 
should identify and manage the environmental 
aspects of its activities, products and services 
that it can control and those it can influence. 
The European Union’s voluntary Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) 
does likewise.   
While there is a lively debate over 
how to operationalize the principle of control 
and influence, and how far up or down the 
value chain it extends, the worldwide 
environmental management community is in 
agreement on the basic proposition: an 
environmental management system should 
address the environmental aspects over which 
an organization determines it has control or 
influence.  ISO 26000 should take a page 
from ISO 14001 and affirm that to call itself 
socially responsible, an organization should 
answer for human rights abuses it can control 
and those it can influence.   
 
Avoiding False Distinctions 
 
“Asking companies to support human rights 
voluntarily where they have leverage is one 
thing,” writes Professor Ruggie, “but 
attributing responsibility to them on that basis 
alone is quite another”.23  This statement 
presupposes a sharp distinction between the 
purely voluntary activity of promoting human 
rights and the obligatory responsibility of 
avoiding human rights abuses.24   
But promotion of human rights and 
avoidance of abuse are regions on a 
continuum, not the two mutually exclusive 
parts of a dichotomy.  The transition between 
them is gradual and continuous, not abrupt.  
Leverage over other actors is just as relevant 
to defining the one as it is to the other, as ISO 
26000 recognizes when it says “an 
organization has the responsibility to respect 
human rights, including in its sphere of 
influence”.25  The utility of the concept of 
sphere of influence is not limited to the 
context of voluntary human rights promotion. 
 
Solving the Business-Human Rights 
Problem 
 
Ultimately, an approach that limits corporate 
responsibility to positive acts of commission 
while ignoring acts of omission is bound to 
fail.  An approach that calibrates 
responsibility to an organization’s degree of 
control and influence over adverse human 
rights impacts is needed to solve the business-
human rights problem.  Acting responsibly 
within an organization’s own workplace is the 
least of the problems facing social 
responsibility (not that it is a small problem).     
The real challenge of social 
responsibility lies in an organization’s 
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relationships with contractors, suppliers, 
customers, local communities and end users.  
Organizations often have substantial influence 
over the decisions and actions of these actors.  
While ISO 26000 is right to 
acknowledge that an organization “cannot be 
held responsible for the impacts of every 
party over which it may have some 
influence,”26 it should equally acknowledge 
that the problem of human rights abuses 
cannot be solved by allowing organizations 
simply to wash their hands of abuses 
perpetrated by actors with whom they have a 
significant relationship and over whom they 
have a significant degree of influence.  
Only by affirming that a firm’s 
responsibility varies with its ability to 
influence decisions and actions will social 
responsibility standards galvanize the sort of 
changes that are needed to improve respect 
for and realization of human rights.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The concept of sphere of influence is central 
to ISO 26000’s definition of social 
responsibility.  It is integrated throughout the 
document.  While its use in ISO 26000 suffers 
from some awkwardness and inconsistency 
(as do many other aspects of the document), it 
sends the right general message.  With the 
greatest respect for Professor Ruggie, the 
WGSR should not change ISO 26000 to 
accommodate his concerns.   
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